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A HISTORICAL REFLECTION ON ARBITRATION AND THE 
CORPORATION AS AN OBJECT OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
Eric George* 
In recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed its emphatic interpretation of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).  In both AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, the Court ruled that the purpose of the FAA was 
not merely to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration by placing 
agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts, 
but to actively promote the use of arbitration on a national 
scale.  In the pursuit of this agenda, the Court has shown that it 
is prepared to oppose measures that would make arbitration 
more sluggish and expensive, even if this means enforcing 
arbitral awards that might conflict with state law or public 
policy. 
 
This Article argues that the Court’s routinely invoked language 
of “costs,” “expediency,” and the need to protect the “freedom 
of contract” has the effect of concealing a transformation that is 
of broader political-economic importance—the creation of 
conditions that protect corporations from public interference.  
When corporations have the assurance that their arbitration 
agreements will, in all likelihood, be enforced, and furthermore, 
that their disputing activities will not be subject to public 
oversight, they gain a greater latitude to act without 
encountering public interference.  In other words, they gain 
more power.  In order to illustrate the dimensions of this shift, I 
identify parallels between the present-day arbitration regime 
and the arbitration movement that culminated in the creation of 
the FAA in the 1920s. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the arbitration regime being fostered 
 
*  Eric George is a PhD candidate in the department of Political Science at York 
University in Toronto. 
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by the United States Supreme Court has disproportionately served 
the interests of corporate disputants.  When the Supreme Court 
opposes measures that will jeopardize the “freedom of contract” 
and makes arbitration more expensive and sluggish, it is aligning 
itself with a laissez-faire vision of arbitration that was promoted by 
early twentieth century legal reformers, and culminated in the 
creation of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.  According to 
proponents of this view, parties to arbitration agreements are 
autonomous, individual, self-regulating agents who should have the 
latitude and discretion to order their disputes free from the 
oversight of the state.  From this vantage point, any law or policy 
that might interfere with the freedom of contract—itself embodied 
in the arbitration agreement—would constitute a threat to the 
integrity of the arbitration system itself.  The resuscitation of this 
1920s vision is significant insofar as it serves to shield corporations 
from public scrutiny. 
The ideological affinity between the present-day arbitration 
regime and that which emerged in the 1920s can be identified along 
two central axes.  First, the Court’s belief that state interference in 
the arbitral process compromises the “freedom of contract” has its 
roots in a laissez-faire inspired conception of business “self-
regulation”—itself buttressed by a commitment to keeping private 
actors free from the intrusion of regulators and policymakers.  
Second, like the arbitration movement of the 1920s, the 
contemporary arbitration regime has been the target of an 
extensive corporate lobbying effort that seeks to ensure that the 
system is aligned with the interests of the business community.  
Such lobbying efforts often pledge to “honor parties’ agreements” 
or to keep arbitration cheap, fast, and flexible.  In reality, they are 
ultimately opposed to greater public interference in the arbitration 
system, irrespective of whether such interference comes from 
judges, regulators, watchdog groups, journalists, or citizens.  Public 
encroachment presents a threat to the values of speed, opacity, and 
finality upon which arbitration is modeled.1 
 
1.  As Thomas Schultz points out, arbitrators are: 
[P]eople . . . whose income, social status, intellectual recognition, or 
professional power, depends to a large extent, on the continued existence 
of arbitration as we have known it for the last few decades.  For such 
people, arbitration must not change.  They would fight tooth and nail to 
keep the arbitration system as it is, or similar to it, to protect it from 
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This Article proceeds in three main sections.  The first section 
provides an overview of critical responses to the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, I argue that the critiques 
of asymmetric bargaining power of the arbitration regime have 
overlooked a less visible, but nonetheless important form of 
power—the protection of corporations from public interference.  
The second section traces this form of business power back to the 
laissez-faire conception of arbitration that informed the early 
twentieth century arbitration movement.  The third section shows 
how the FAA was the target of an extensive corporate lobbying 
effort that sought to promote the principles of business “self-
governance” and private-ordering.  The Article concludes with a 
reflection on the parallels between the 1920s arbitration reform 
movement and present-day efforts to limit public involvement in 
the arbitration system, and the way that such measures serve the 
interests of capital. 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY BACKLASH AGAINST ARBITRATION 
Arbitration is conventionally treated as a private, contractual, 
and non-adjudicative mechanism of dispute resolution that leads to 
a more efficient distribution of judicial resources.  As a cheaper, 
faster, and more flexible surrogate to civil litigation, it is not only 
thought to be of benefit to the parties immediately involved in the 
dispute (the claimant and the respondent), but to produce a 
number of positive second-order effects for society as a whole.2  
 
possibly destabilizing interferences. 
THOMAS SCHULTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LEGALITY: STATELESS LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (2014). 
2.  The view that arbitration is efficiency promoting finds exponents in the areas 
of both domestic and international arbitration.  As Walter Mattli and Thomas Dietz 
argue, for example, “The economic rationalist model further implies that 
organizational efficiency of arbitration forums is good not only for the contracting 
parties (by generating private gains), it also is good for the wider public.”  Walter 
Mattli & Thomas Dietz, Mapping and Assessing the Rise of International Commercial 
Arbitration in the Globalization Era: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE 9 (2014).  For a similar view, albeit, in the area of domestic arbitration, see 
Stephen Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good?: ‘Overcrowded Courts’ and the Private-
Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899, 921 (2013).  
For an overview of the merits of privatizing dispute resolution services, see LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN & ERIN A. O’HARA, THE LAW MARKET (2009). 
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Such effects include the decongestion of overcrowded court 
dockets, the creation of a more responsive market for adjudication 
services, and the placement of downward pressure on consumer 
prices by reducing legal costs.3  In addition to these material 
benefits, arbitration-friendly policies are thought to promote the 
value of private autonomy—the idea that individuals are best able 
to determine how they wish their disputes to be adjudicated.4  
Under this general argumentative framework, the United States 
Supreme Court has spearheaded a distinctly pro-arbitration policy 
over the last forty years.5 
However, amidst the acclaimed “arbitration revolution,” most 
visibly incarnate in the Supreme Court’s emphatic approach to 
arbitration and the massive expansion of the arbitration services 
sector, there have been a number of dissenting voices.6  One of the 
first and best-known critiques came almost as soon as the 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) movement had begun.  In 
his now well-known piece “Against Settlement,” Owen Fiss 
presented a series of criticisms against the increasingly emboldened 
 
3.  Gillian Hadfield identifies the state’s “inherent monopoly” over the provision 
of adjudication services as the primary contributor to the inefficiency of litigation.  In 
her view, the state is “unresponsive to costs, reluctant to innovate, bureaucratic in its 
methods of collecting and processing information, shut off from entrepreneurial 
creativity and effort.”  Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, 24 REG. 40, 40 
(2001).  See also Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001) (suggesting that 
such businesses may pass on savings to consumers.). 
4.  As Thomas Carbonneau explains, “Parties in the marketplace should be at 
liberty to agree to any exchange to which they mutually consent and which complies 
with the minimal requisites of public policy.”  Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in 
Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 400 
(2008).  Hiro Aragaki places emphasis on the wide berth given to disputants to 
determine the terms by which the dispute will be arbitrated: “Unlike the one-size-fits-
all approach of litigation, arbitration’s hallmark has been the wide scope of choice that 
it provides for parties to design a disputing procedure best suited to their needs and 
circumstances.”  Hiro N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements 
Promote Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 1143, 1145 (2015). 
5.  For an overview of the Supreme Court’s support for arbitration, see Stephen 
L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996). 
6.  Thomas Carbonneau characterizes the increased use of arbitration over the 
last forty years as a “revolution in law.”  Thomas E. Carbonneau, Revolution in Law 
through Arbitration, The Eighty-Fourth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar 
Lecture, 56 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 233 (2008). 
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proponents of arbitration.7  While the advocates of ADR had 
pledged their efforts to discovering faster and cheaper forms of 
litigation as a means of achieving procedural reform, Fiss argued 
that such endeavors overlooked the problem of power.  At the 
heart of the reform movement was the assumption that disputes 
involved consenting individuals.  Yet, in conceiving of parties as 
“individuals” or “neighbors,” Fiss argued that the proponents of 
ADR had turned a blind eye to the problem of organizational 
power and wealth of large-scale organizations like corporations, 
government agencies, or unions—all of whom had greater chances 
of winning legal disputes against weaker parties.8   In Fiss’ view, the 
administrators of private tribunals had fewer resources at their 
disposal than courts did to address imbalances of power between 
disputants, and were far less likely to yield just outcomes than 
public courts.9 
We know in retrospect that the early critiques of ADR made 
by Fiss and others did little to slow down the extraordinary 
expansion of the arbitration system that developed over the 
subsequent decades.10  As the popularity of arbitration surged 
throughout the 1990s, even some of the more poignant criticisms of 
arbitration resounded faintly amidst what one commentator 
referred to as “the triumph of arbitration.”11  Moreover, it became 
increasingly clear that the earlier progressive hopes for a more 
“human” and “dialogic” form of adjudication had been overtaken 
by a push for “alternatives to the high cost of litigation” from the 
corporate sector.12  By 1991, Carrie Menkel-Meadow spoke of 
 
7.  See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1983). 
8.  Fiss thought that the greatest potential for abuse arose from asymmetric 
bargaining scenarios.  “In these cases, the distribution of financial resources, or the 
ability of one party to pass along its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining process, 
and the settlement will be at odds with a conception of justice that seeks to make the 
wealth of the parties irrelevant.”  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  For early critiques of ADR, see, e.g., CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW 
JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO 
COURT (1985); RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST 
SOCIETY: THE EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE (1987); Harry T. Edwards, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986). 
11.  Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 423 (2008). 
12.  The International Institute for Conflict Prevention (CPR) is an arbitration 
advocacy group that seeks to promote solutions to the high costs of litigation faced by 
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ADR “as a tale of social innovation co-opted.”  A decade later, 
Bryant Garth described the private market for dispute resolution 
services as increasingly hierarchical and divided with one segment 
providing wealthy disputants “a-la-carte” arbitration services and 
the other “low-end justice for the rank and file.”13 
It is only recently, however, that the critique of arbitration has 
come back into the public arena, and this time, much more 
forcefully than before.  In response to the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion14 and American Express Co. 
v. Italian Colors Restaurant,15 an increasing number of scholars 
have argued that the Court’s pro-arbitration policy has enabled 
businesses to thwart lawsuits brought against them by consumers 
and employees.16  Critics have claimed that the Court’s willingness 
to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, class-action waivers, and 
other fine-print arbitration agreements has served to deny 
consumers and employees access to the courts, while at the same 
time relieving business disputants of unwanted litigation—evidence 
of pro-business bias.17  These issues appear to have gained 
increasing public attention following a three-part 2015 New York 
Times investigation into the use of arbitration agreements in fine 
print contracts, and, more recently, in a New York Review of 
Books article by Justice Jed Rakoff of the Southern District Court 
 
corporations.  It counts a number of Fortune 500 listed firms amongst its corporate 
pledge signers.  See 21st Century Pledge, CPR (July 21, 2014), https://www.cpradr.org/
resource-center/adr-pledges/21st-century-pledge [https://perma.cc/JM6P-ZKGS]. 
13.  Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic 
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 
928, 932 (2001). 
14.  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
15.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
16.  See for example, Hiro Aragaki, who argues the Supreme Court’s “pro-
arbitration” policy has effectively negated state courts’ ability to review or overturn 
arbitral awards.  Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1233, 1233 (2011).  See also David Schwartz, who views mandatory arbitration 
agreements as a violation of the principle of consent.  David S. Schwartz, Claim-
Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L.J. 239, 244 (2012).  Judith Resnik 
associates the privatization of adjudication, of which arbitration is an instance, with the 
evisceration of rights generally.  Judith Resnik Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the 
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J. 
2804 (2014). 
17.  See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It 
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
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of New York.18 
What the new wave of criticism shares in common with the old 
is a heightened awareness of the potential abuses of corporate 
power in arbitration.  It focuses on the way in which corporations 
have been able to use their superior wealth, organizational 
resources, and knowledge to gain strategic advantages over 
consumers and employees.  Yet this focus on inequalities between 
disputants has the side effect of drawing attention away from a 
more general form of political-economic power engendered by the 
arbitration regime.  That is, the way the Court’s policy of deferring 
to arbitral awards shields commercial disputants from public 
interference.  This policy is waged in the name of “cost,” 
“expediency,” and “the freedom of contract,” but it has a more 
important effect that has not been paid sufficient attention: it alters 
the corporation as an object of governance.  When corporations are 
assured that their disputes will not be publicized, and only in the 
narrowest of circumstances be subject to review, they gain greater 
latitude to act without encountering resistance from judges, 
lawmakers, or civil society—in other words, they gain more power. 
We can learn much about how the present-day arbitration 
regime shields corporate actors from public interference in 
revisiting the arbitration movement that emerged in the 1920s.  Not 
only did the period witness a surge of interest in arbitration, but it 
also offers the closest historical analogue to our current period of 
capitalism marked by the privatization of public services, corporate 
influence over the legislative process, belief in the self-executing 
power of markets, and organized anti-redistributionary sentiment.  
In the following section, I shall highlight the way that the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions can be seen as a revival of 1920s ideals of 
 
18.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N. Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-
deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4ZHD-LWTW].  As Justice Rakoff writes,  
[C]ompanies have widely imposed mandatory arbitration clauses on their 
employees and customers, so as to deny them access to the courts, as well 
as to exclude them from exercising their constitutional right to a jury. In 
addition, since the Concepcion decision, most such clauses also forbid 
people with complaints to bring class action claims, even in arbitration. 
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free enterprise and business “self-regulation.” 
 
 
II. ARBITRATION AND THE IDEAL OF BUSINESS SELF-
REGULATION 
In this section, I claim that the Supreme Court’s policy of 
deferring to arbitral authority by “honoring parties expectations” 
resuscitates a laissez-faire-inspired ideal of arbitration that found 
its most cogent expression in the early twentieth century arbitration 
reform movement.19  Taken at face value, the Court’s pledge to 
keep arbitration cheap, fast, and flexible, and its defense of the 
“freedom of contract,” appear innocuous and devoid of ideological 
content.  However, when we understand the broader historical 
context in which this discourse is embedded, the political-economic 
parameters of the Court’s pro-arbitration policy come into sharper 
relief. 
Although periods of experimentation with arbitration in 
America can be traced as far back as the colonial period, the 
current fascination with arbitration and private alternatives to 
court finds its most compelling precedent in the early twentieth 
century arbitration reform movement.20  The proponents of the 
1920s arbitration reform movement were primarily interested in 
developing alternatives to what they perceived to be the excessive 
costs, delays, and rupture of business friendships that were 
associated with litigation in courts of law.21  Faced with 
anachronistic “judicial machinery” that had not kept pace with 
rapid advances in business organization, they vowed to devise 
 
19.  The Court’s deferential approach to arbitration is described by Stephen Ware 
as “rest[ing] on the premise that arbitration law is a part of contract law so courts must 
enforce agreements to arbitrate unless contract law provides a ground for denying 
enforcement.”  Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law 
(with a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 
195 (1997). 
20.  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860 145–54 (1977). 
21.  Although figures in the movement were interested in developing private 
alternatives to the court for “the layman,” and did discuss the potential uses of 
arbitration in family court settings, the main focus was on devising cost-effective 
alternatives to business litigation.  Amy J. Cohen, Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 
J. DISP. RESOL. 91 (2011). 
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inexpensive, speedy, and flexible forums of dispute resolution that 
were better suited to the realities of modern commerce.22  Thus, 
Charles Bernheimer could proclaim in 1926 that “[t]o litigate, the 
most wasteful procedure to which a business man can resort, means 
strife expense, annoyance and the rupture of business friendship, 
sapping the very lifeblood of commerce.”23  By making the 
agreements to arbitrate “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,” the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sought to overturn longstanding 
judicial antipathy to enforcing arbitration agreements, thereby 
facilitating commercial parties’ access to private tribunals.24 
While the proponents of arbitration reform focused mainly on 
rectifying problems of cost and delay, they were also committed to 
a broader regulatory framework that promoted private ordering 
against direct state interference in business affairs.  In the words of 
Frances Kellor, Vice-President of the Arbitration Society of 
America, the choice to arbitrate was understood to be an 
expression of “the natural right of self-regulation,” 
“independence,” and “self-reliance” against state encroachment.25  
The idea that arbitration should remain free from state interference 
fit within a broader political-economic vision of laissez-faire, in 
which private ordering was preferred to the direct involvement of 
the Federal regulatory agencies.26 
 
22.  William L. Ransom, The Layman’s Demand for Improved Judicial 
Machinery, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 146 (1917) (“The difficulty is 
coming as to the mechanics of our judicial system, the suitability of present-day legal 
procedure as a modern device for the accomplishment of a basic end, the 
administration of prompt, impartial justice under law.”). 
23.  Charles L. Bernheimer, The Advantages of Arbitration Procedure, 124 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 98 (1926). 
24.  Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York 
Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147, 160 (1921).  As early as 1917, William Ransom could write 
that courts’ excessive technicality  
naturally arouse the contempt of a business man . . . [driven] from the court house 
with the impression that he and other business men are sure to lose, no matter who 
wins the juridical verdict, if they have anything to do with “a game played under 
such rules”; they represent a kind of “trappings” and “red tape” which business 
men have long since rejected, in the conduct of other aspects of human 
relationship. 
Ransom, supra note 22, at 149. 
25.  FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, 
FUNCTIONS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS 121 (1999). 
26.  As Katherine Van Wezel Stone explains, “New capitalists rejected 
progressive models of government intervention in the economy, advocating instead a 
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It would not be until the onset of the Depression that the 
arbitration system would draw criticism for being a bastion of 
free-enterprise against the regulatory power of the state.  In 1934, 
Thurman Arnold observed that “arbitration machinery has become 
a device to maintain the aloof position of courts and to isolate them 
from the technique of investigation and conference.”27  In the same 
year, Phillip G. Phillips, observing the way arbitration delimited the 
judiciary’s ability to address economic problems of national 
importance, posed the question: 
But what function have our courts in a nation dedicated to 
recovery by improvement of business conditions if it is not to 
adjudicate commercial controversies and thereby lay down 
rules of law which will assist in the recovery process?  To strip 
them of this power would be collective laissez-faire of a most 
unusual type, a species of fanatical action one would expect in 
business anarchy and not in an industrial democracy based on a 
partnership between government and business.28 
In the order of “business anarchy” described by Phillips, 
corporations used arbitration as a means of avoiding public scrutiny 
and circumventing the regulatory oversight of the state. 
III. THE FAA’S CORPORATE LOBBY 
The claim that business has supported the formation of the 
FAA is, on its own, uncontroversial.29  Historians have documented 
the activities of a number of business and trade associations that 
lobbied in favor of the Act through the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, the American Bar Association, and the Arbitration 
 
vision of self-regulation of business through trade associations.”  Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 931, 990 (1998). 
27.  Thurman W. Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
913, 929 (1934). 
28.  Philip G. Phillips, Commercial Arbitration Under the NRA, 1 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 424, 439–40 (1934). 
29.  Indeed, the main spokespersons for the Act were representatives of private 
associations, not by elected officials, and the greater share of congressional testimony 
appears to have come from private interests.  As Imre S. Szalai writes, “During the 
1924 Hearings regarding the proposed legislation, virtually all of the written and oral 
testimony came from witnesses appearing on behalf of or at the request of commercial 
interests.”  Imre S. Szalai, Modern Arbitration Values and the First World War, 49 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 380–81 (2007). 
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Society of America.30  In characterizing such lobbying efforts as led 
by “merchants” and “traders,” historians have generally 
overlooked the degree to which lobbying efforts were supported by 
the ascendant force in the nation’s economy: large-scale, vertically 
integrated, limited liability corporations.31  Indeed, the period 
between 1910 and 1930 was characterized by extraordinary 
advancements in corporate organization, and saw the consolidation 
of a number of business giants, including: General Motors, Ford, 
General Electric, the Radio Corporation of America, 
Westinghouse, and the Sears Roebuck Corporation—many of 
which were part of lobbying efforts in support of commercial 
arbitration.32  This oversight is important for two reasons.  First, it 
understates the role of elite actors in mobilizing for legal reform, 
making it seem like the FAA’s social basis of support was much 
wider and grassroots-led than it actually was.33  Second, in 
overlooking corporate incentives to arbitrate, existing accounts of 
the FAA miss the importance of regulatory-avoidance strategies 
that were enabled by the emergent arbitration regime. 
Business support for the FAA is commonly attributed to two 
driving forces.  The first is the New York Chamber of Commerce’s 
Committee on Arbitration, which, led by Charles Bernheimer and 
Julius Cohen, spearheaded a massive lobbying campaign seeking to 
promote the use of arbitration amongst both business and the 
broader public.34  The second is what Katherine Van Wezel Stone 
 
30.  See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: 
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Van Wezel 
Stone, supra note 26, at 931. 
31.  See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR, THE VISIBLE HAND (1993).  
According to Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, the modern business corporation was 
unparalleled in terms of its economic power and ability to direct human affairs.  
ADOLF AUGUSTUS BERLE & GARDINER COIT MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991). 
32.  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N., DECENNIAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON THE PROGRESS OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
1926–1936 (1936), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104315850;view=
1up;seq=3 [https://perma.cc/UX7C-RDWD]. 
33.  See, e.g., Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155, 163 (1970) (describing the Arbitration Society of America as 
“representative of many groups of people from all walks of life, participating in a new 
concept of arbitration.”).   
34.  As Ian Macneil points out, during “Arbitration Week” in 1923, Charles L. 
Bernheimer “arranged a program in which more than fifty trade and commercial 
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identifies as the association movement, referring to the increasing 
national prominence of trade associations that arose under the 
corporatist economic policy harbored by Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover, who would later serve on the board of the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA).35  Since many trade 
associations already had well-developed, privately administered 
systems of arbitration in place to resolve disputes amongst their 
members, they were naturally in favor of efforts to bolster the 
legitimacy and national profile of arbitration. 
Mirroring the discourse of early twentieth-century arbitration 
reformers, scholars have spoken of “merchants,” “commercial 
interests,” “traders,” and the broader “business community” to 
describe the business interests that promoted arbitration during the 
1920s.  While there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the 
FAA did attract the interest of numerous small businesses and 
merchants, this language tends to overlook cleavages of market 
power that existed amongst the FAA’s business following. 
Scholars have overlooked the way in which support for both 
Bernheimer’s Committee on Arbitration and Moses Grossman’s 
Arbitration Society of America hailed from elements of the 
ascendant U.S. corporate sector.  To gain a sense of the magnitude 
and scope of corporate backing for the FAA, it is instructive to 
observe the general membership of the New York Chamber of 
Commerce.  Between 1910 and 1930, the period roughly coinciding 
with the height of the arbitration movement, the commodities 
traders that had dominated the Chamber’s membership in the mid-
nineteenth century were increasingly eclipsed by directors of large-
scale corporations.  The Chamber’s 1922 annual report, for 
example, features chief executives from virtually every major sector 
of American business, including banking, insurance, rail, radio and 
telecommunications, oil and gas, retail, automotive, and textiles.36  
These include the leaders of some of largest industrialists in the 
United States, including Gerard Swope, President of General 
 
organizations participated.”  MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 38.  
35.  “The growth of commercial arbitration went hand in hand with the explosive 
growth of trade associations in the 1920s.”  Van Wezel Stone, supra note 26, at 977–78. 
36.  See generally N.Y. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SIXTY FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK FOR THE YEAR 1921–1922 34–70 (1922), https://babel.hathitrust.org/
cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015067348808; view=1up;seq=5 [https://perma.cc/6MG7-C5YB]. 
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Electric; Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Radio Corporation of 
America; Jules Bache, investment banker and majority shareholder 
of Dome Mines; and Charles M. Schwab, President of U.S. Steel.37 
On its own, the incidence of these corporate magnates 
amongst the Chamber’s membership is nothing more than 
suggestive.  It does not offer sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
FAA was necessarily any more “pro-corporate” than it favored 
“small business.”  For example, it is quite possible that elements of 
the Chamber’s activity took a passive stance on the arbitration, and 
left organizing activities to the Chamber’s Committee on 
Arbitration.  Yet there is evidence that corporate sponsorship of 
the Act was more than just salutary or incidental, but in fact heavily 
enmeshed in the planning process. 
Frances Kellor, who acted as Vice-President of the American 
Arbitration Society (which changed its name to the American 
Arbitration Association in 1926), wrote a largely promotional, but 
nevertheless informative history of the arbitration movement in 
1948 entitled American Arbitration, its History, Functions and 
Achievements.38  In the section “Builders of American 
Arbitration” she lists some of key business patrons of the 
Arbitration Society.  These included: Julius Rosenwald, President 
of Sears Roebuck corporation; Felix S. Warburg, of the renowned 
European banking dynasty; and John D. Rockefeller of Standard 
Oil.  Anson Burchard, Vice-President of General Electric, would 
later serve as the first president of the AAA, the result of the 
merger between Bernheimer’s Arbitration Foundation and Moses 
Grossman’s Arbitration Society of America.39 
By 1936, six years after the FAA was ratified by Calvin 
Coolidge, the AAA’s board of directors included an even broader 
base of big-business support.  They included the National City 
Bank of New York, the Metropolitan Trust Company, Goodyear 
 
37.  See generally id.; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 32.  
38.  See generally KELLOR, supra note 25. 
39.  See generally JOHN N. INGHAM, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS (Greenwood Publ’g Grp., 1983).  The American 
Arbitration Association was formed through a merger of Moses Grossman’s 
Arbitration Society of America and Charles Bernheimer’s Arbitration Foundation.  
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, 
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 40 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) 
MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 40. 
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Tire & Rubber Company, Metropolitan Insurance Company, and 
Western Electric.40 
The convergence of corporate giants in the arbitration 
movement—and the subsequent influence they exerted on its 
central institutions—should cast doubt on the still widely held view 
that the arbitration movement was, in the first instance, inspired by 
the values of progressivism.  While the movement did enlist the 
contributions of social reformers like Roscoe Pound and saw 
business representatives speak of the importance of improving 
judicial machinery for “the layman,” such commitments seem to 
pale in comparison to the business forces that mobilized behind the 
FAA.41  Instead of juxtaposing two mutually exclusive visions of 
arbitration—one dedicated to laissez-faire, another to progressive 
reform—the more interesting question is how the business has been 
able to successfully frame its campaign of judicial privatization in 
such a way that has the appearance of benefiting the common 
good. 
CONCLUSION 
I have shown how the arbitration reform movement of the 
1920s drew on an extensive basis of corporate support and 
demonstrated the way that it centered on laissez-faire-inspired 
notions of free-enterprise, individual autonomy, and reliance.  It 
would be a mistake to understand such efforts as merely being 
occupied with the issues of “cost and delay.”  Rather, I argue that 
proponents of arbitration reform were seeking to reorganize state 
power in such a way that bolstered businesses’ ability to act without 
encountering public interference.  The significance of this project 
did not necessarily lie in allowing businesses to abuse their superior 
bargaining power over weaker disputants, but in realigning the 
regulatory power of the state in such a way that promoted private 
ordering.  The critics of the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant have raised the spectre of corporate power in 
contractual arbitration.  Where those critics could go much further, 
 
40.  See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 32. 
41.  It provides a forum admirably adapted for the settlement of the troubles of 
the small man or the poor man who cannot stand the stress and expense of protracted 
litigation.  Bernheimer, supra note 23, at 99–100. 
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however, is in studying the less conspicuous modes through which 
business disputants have used arbitration to their own advantage.  
Those who hold hopes for more progressive or democratic uses of 
arbitration should take stock of the ongoing campaign of judicial 
privatization being waged by courts, corporations, and 
governments, and shed greater light on the strategies of regulatory 
avoidance in which they enable corporations to engage. 
